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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petition for rehearing may be filed within fourteen days after entry of decision.
Utah R App P Rule 35 [Petition for rehearing.]
Time for filing is computed by excluding the day from which the period begins
and including the last day; furthermore when any paper has been served via mail,
an additional three days is added to the prescribed period.
Utah R App P Rule 22 [Computation and enlargement of time.]
Court of appeals retains jurisdiction over the case and no remittitur can issue
until expiration of time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
Utah R App P Rule 36 [Issuance of remittitur.]
Utah R App P Rule 48 [Time for petitioning.]
Hi-Country Homeowners v Foothills Water 942 P.2d 305 (UT 1996)
December 17,1998, (Thurs.), Memorandum Decision was filed & mailed.
December 31,1998, (Thurs.), is fourteen days after entry of decision.
January 4,1999, (Mon.), is the last day for filing petition for rehearing since
three days are added for reason Memorandum Decision was mailed; however last day
falls on Sunday, and therefore, next business day is last day to file.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
MOOTNESS CANNOT DEFEAT CLAIM THAT
TRIBUNAL LACKED JURISDICTION IN THE CASE.
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Case No. 98-1523-CA
Utah Court of Appeals

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Question of jurisdiction is decided by the appeals court de novo and
as a matter of law without deference to the trial court.
Holm v Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992)
[Jurisdiction decided by appeals court as question of law
without deference to the District Court]
Rimensburger v Rimensburger 841 P. 2d 709 (Utah App. 1992)
[Jurisdiction reviewed as question of law by appeals court
independently without deference to trial court.]
Curtis v Curtis 789 P.2d 717 (Utah App. 1990)
[If court lacks jurisdiction over subject matter or individuals
involved, it has no power to entertain the suit.]
Barlow v Cappo 821 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1991)
[Jurisdiction is reviewed by appeals court de novo
and as a matter of law.]
Kamdar & Co. v Larav Co.. Inc. 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991)
[Appellate court review is de novo to determine whether
as a matter of law jurisdiction exists.]
Van Per Stappen v Van Per Stappen 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991)
[Question of whether jurisdiction exists is one of law,
reviewed by appeals court without deference
to the trial court]
State. Pept. of Social Services v Vijil 784 P 2d 1130 (Utah 1989)
[Jurisdictional determination decided by appeals court as
question of law without deference to the district court.]
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/96)
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.)
UTAH CASE LAW
Green v Green 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986)
State v Garcia 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (CA 7/16/98)
State. Dept. of Social Services v Vijil 784 P 2d 1130 (Utah 1989)
FEDERAL CASE LAW
Facio v Jones 714 F. Supp. 504 (D. Utah 1988)
Layton v Swapp 484 F.Supp. 958 (DC UT 1979)
Morton v Ruiz 415 US 199. 39 L Ed 2d 270. 94 S Ct 1055 (1974)
Thompson v Citv of Louisville 362 US 199. 80 S Ct 624. 4 L Ed 2d 654 (1960)
United States v Nixon 418 US 683. 41 L Ed 2d 1039. 94 S Ct 3090 (1974)
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] Utah Constitution
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant filed with administrative agency ["DLD"] Motion to Dismiss &
Memorandum of Authority based upon lacked jurisdiction since no sworn report was
filed as required by agency rule [UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing"
(10/1/96)]: [UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.)].
Agency did not contest, challenge, deny existence, or dispute existence or validity of its
own administrative rule; however, believed that unsworn report was a "non-substantive
issue" denied reconsideration and suspended defendant's license.
Appellant filed timely appeal to the District Court and filed a "Motion to Vacate
Agency Action for Lack of Jurisdiction [No Sworn Report] & Memorandum of Authority.
District Court has derivative jurisdiction only over appeals from administrative agencies
[UAC 62-46d-15 "Judicial Review]: therefore, if the agency had no jurisdiction because
of failure to abide by its own regulation, the District Court acquired no jurisdiction.
Agency in the District Court did not contest, challenge, deny, or dispute
existence or validity of its own administrate rule; however, notwithstanding same,
District Court found agency jurisdiction and therefore denied the motion on grounds
not raised by either party.
Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals from the district court.

Appellant Petition for ReHearing
DPS v Mair

Case No. 98-1523-CA
Utah Court of Appeals

Page 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
May 31,1997 (Sat), defendant was arrested by the Utah County Sheriff's
Office for "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol." [Citation # D 268425]
June 4,1997 (Wed.), Utah County Sheriffs Office postmarked to the
Driver License Division copy of Citation # D 268425.
June 18,1997 (Wed.), Driver License Division gave notice to the defendant
that hearing would be held based upon the officer's written [unsworn] report.
June 27,1997 (Fri.), Informal hearing scheduled and held in Orem, Utah,
before hearing officer Herb Wilson.
June 30,1997 (Mon.), defendant filed a written request for Hearing Officer's
findings of fact ["reasons for decision].
July 16,1997 (Wed.), order was postmarked from agency indicating defendant
was suspended, effective date of 6/29/97.
July 22,1997 (Tues.), findings ["reason for decision"] postmarked from the
agency to counsel.
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August 13,1997 (Wed.), pursuant to the defendant's statutory right of
administrative review, filed with the agency this date "Request for Reconsideration."
August 20,1997, Agency in response to a request for reconsideration issued its
final agency action [as the appellate court has defined by case law] by letter. See:
Maverick Country Stores v Industrial Comm'n 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993).
September 17,1997, Petition for review was filed with the Third District Court
within thirty days of final agency action as provided for and allowed by the code. See;
UCA 63-46 b-14 "Judicial review- Exhaustion of administrative remedies/'
September 24,1997, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Agency Action for Lack
of Jurisdiction [No Sworn Report] said motion being consistent with and provided for by
CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions."
Appellant filed a timely appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
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PETITION FOR REHEARING
[Point of Law or Facts Misapprehended]
Defendant at all times before the administrative agency challenged its jurisdiction
for failure to comply with its own regulations which require a "sworn report" as follows:
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/96)
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.)
A claim of mootness does not supercede, or defeat a claim of lack of jurisdiction
by the original tribunal. In no case in which the appellate court has asserted mootness
has there been an underlying claim that the original tribunal totally lacked jurisdiction
over the case based upon a specific regulation, which contrary to agency assertions,
existed both prior to the defendant's hearing and after the defendant's hearing thereby
entitling him to rely thereon and require that the court examine the issue in its entirety
notwithstanding any assertion of mootness by the agency.
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CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Counsel, pursuant to rule, certifies that this petition for rehearing is presented
in good faith, not for delay, and raises legitimate issues in this case which it believed
the court has either overlooked or misapprehended the nature of the argument.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mootness cannot defeat a claim that an agency tribunal lacked jurisdiction in a
case for failure to follow its own administrative regulation shown to exist both before the
date of hearing and after the date of hearing.
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT
MOOTNESS CANNOT DEFEAT CLAIM THAT
TRIBUNAL LACKED JURISDICTION IN THE CASE.
Utah Administrative Code section in issue was enacted 10/01/96 prior io
the date of the defendant's arrest or hearing, and it required the officer to submit
a "sworn report" to the agency within five days after the date of arrest.
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/96)
"... The officer shall send to the department within five days after
the date of arrest the person's license, along with a copy of the citation
issued and the officer's sworn report indicating the chemical test results
(if any) and other information relevant to the arrest and chemical test...."
This particular section, was republished 10/01/97 after the date of the
defendant's hearing and appears in the supplement to the administrative code
as follows:
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.)
"... The officer shall send to the department within five days after
the date of arrest the person's license, along with a copy of the citation
issued and the officer's sworn report indicating the chemical test results
(if any) and other information relevant to the arrest and chemical test...."

Page 9
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Where the appellant has been deprived of a right guaranteed to him by statute
or by regulations issued pursuant thereto, he has been denied due process pursuant
to the Court of Appeals own decision as follows:
State v Garcia 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (CA 7/16/98)
"The second form of protection provided under the Due Process
Clause requires that states follow certain procedural rules where failure to
do so implicates a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory right of the
defendant. See United States es rel. Accardi v Shaughnessey, 347 U.S
260, 265, 74 S. Ct. 499 502 (1954) (stating "crucial question is
whether the alleged conduct... deprived petitioner of any of the
rights guaranteed by him by the statute or by the regulations issued
pursuant thereto."); cf. United States v. Carceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749, 99
S. Ct. 1465, 1470(1979)."
It is incumbent upon the administrative agency to follow its own internal
procedures even when such internal procedures are more rigorous than would
otherwise be required.
Morton v Ruiz 415 US 199. 39 L Ed 2d 270. 94 S Ct 1055 (1974)
"...@ pg 294 ... Where the rights of individuals are affected, it
is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so
even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than
otherwise would be required. Service v Dulles, 354 US 363, 388,
1 L Ed 2d 1403, 77 S Ct 1152 (1957); Vitarelli v Seaton, 359 US 535,
539-540, 3 L Ed 2d 1012, 79 S Ct 968 (1959)...."
Layton v Swapp 484 F.Supp. 958 (DC UT 1979)
"...@pg 961 ...Implicit in the concept of "due process" are two ideas:
First, government, here Davis County government, must follow its own
rules. Second, it must do so within a reasonable time...."
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An agency is free to repeal any regulation in its entirety, but where it is
shown that the regulation existed both prior to the defendant's hearing and after the
defendant's hearing, the agency is required to follow its regulation and the courts are
required to examine and enforce same.
United States v Nixon 418 US 683. 41 L Ed 2d 1039. 94 S Ct 3090 (1974)
"...@ pg 1057 ... [8] So long as this regulation is extant it has the
force of law. In United States ex rel. Accardi v Shaughnessy, 347 US
260, 98 L Ed 681, 74 S Ct 499 (1954)...
...Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible of the Attorney
General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special
Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so.10 So long as this
regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it,
and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the
three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it..."
The jurisdiction of the district court over the appeal from the administrative action
was derivative only since the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for a judicial
review after exhaustion of administrative remedies.
UCA 63-46b-14 "Judicial review Exhaustion of administrative remedies."
"(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued
under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)."
Final agency action (8/20/97) See; Maverick Country Stores v Industrial
Comm'n 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993).
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Once the case was appealed to the district court, there existed a duty to
specifically examine whether the agency properly exercised jurisdiction contrary to its
own regulations. If the agency did not properly exercise jurisdiction then the district
court had no jurisdiction other than to vacate the agency action. See;
Allred v Allred 835 P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1992)
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v Lamoreaux 767 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1989)
Thompson v Jackson 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1987)
If in fact the regulations existed both prior to and after the defendant's
administrative hearing, it raises question as to whether or not this particular defendant
has clearly been denied due process notwithstanding any other issue or repeal of the
regulation subsequent to his case being heard.
State Dept. of Social Services v Vijil 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989)
"...@ pg 1132 ...[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment
is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court
has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment
cannot stand without denying due process to the one
against whom it runs...."
Brimhall v Mecham 27 UT 2d 222. 494 P.2d 525 (Utah 1972)
"...@pg 526...A judgment is void...if the court which rendered
it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it acted
in a manner inconsistent with due process of law...."
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If an underlying judgment is void because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the
passage of time alone cannot legitimate or otherwise make such ruling valid. There is
no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. A void judgment cannot acquire
validity because of passage of time See: Green v Green 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986).
An order and judgment is void for lack of due process in its rendition if the tribunal
"acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law."
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
substantive right of due process is of no avail unless the court grants him the ancillary
right of appeal.
Thompson v City of Louisville 362 US 199. 80 S Ct 624.
4 L Ed 2d 654 (1960)
"... @ pg 657 ... Appellee's substantive right of due process
is of no avail to him unless this court grants him the ancillary right
whereby he may test same in the Supreme Court...."
This case is significant for reason that the issue of mootness became
significantly entwined with the extraordinary relief granted by the United States
Supreme Court, and the significance of the case is such that it is enclosed in its entirety
in the appendix hereto.
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Finally, within a different context, the United States District Court for Utah
was required to interpret the United States Supreme Court decision which held that the
requirement of showing a meritorious defense as necessary to set aside a default
judgment was unconstitutional. [Peralta v Heights Medical Center. Inc.. 485 US 80.
108 S Ct. 896. 99 L Ed 75 (1988)]. Argument had been made that the issue was moot
because the judgment had been paid in full although involuntarily through garnishment.
Notwithstanding said fact, the Federal District Court for Utah rejected the idea that
the constitutional rights of a particular individual may be violated in the interest of
judicial economy even though there clearly was a procedural violation. The court in so
ruling held "It is manifest that judicial economy is not a valid basis or reason to
justify the violation of constitutional rights...." [Facio v Jones 714 F. Supp. 504
(D. Utah 1988)]. The Tenth Circuit vacated the decision on other grounds,
specifically that Utah Supreme Court should be given an opportunity to first consider
the issue before the Federal Courts intervene. See: Facio v Jones 929 F.2d 541
(10th Cir. 1991).
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CONCLUSION
Administrative agencies are required to comply with their own rules and in this
case the agency did not challenge or deny existence of its own rule, and furthermore, is
precluded by United States Supreme Court decisions from attacking its own rule.
Agency may amend or revoke the rule at any time, but may not do so in a case in which
a party relies thereon. In no prior appellate decision, where mootness was an issue,
was there an underlying claim that the original tribunal totally lacked jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in the case before the court, the regulation complained of existed both
prior to the defendant's hearing and after the defendant's hearing. Therefore, the claim
of lack of jurisdiction goes not only to due process under the Utah State Constitution
and federal constitution, but also the guarantee under the state constitution that the
court will resort to fundamental principles as follows:
Article I Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] Utah Constitution
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government."
RELIEF REQUESTED
It is respectively suggested that the court has misapprehended the nature of
the legal claim which defendant raises, and in light of further explanation, request
is made that the matter be restored to the calendar for full briefing.
DATED this t f l S ^ d a v

of

< ^ ^ / W ? % t ^ ^ ^

19

Steven Lee(Pa)
Attorney for Defendant / Appeflartt
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FILED
DEC 1 7 1998
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Department of Public Safety,
Driver License Division, State
of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Lonnie R. Mair,

Case No. 981523-CA
F I L E D
(December 17, 1998)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba
Attorneys

Steven Lee Payton, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant appeals from an order of the district court
denying his motion to vacate the findings and conclusions of the
Department of Public Safety. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
Appellant has already served his ninety day suspension and
this court can, therefore, provide no meaningful relief. See
Phillips v. Schwendiman. 802 P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In
Phillips, this court dismissed two consolidated appeals as moot
where the appeals were filed after the appellants1 license
revocation periods had expired, noting that "Utah courts have
consistently refused to hear the merits of driver's license
revocation appeals rendered moot because the revocation period
has expired." Phillips. 802 P.2d at 110. See also Jones v.
Schwendiman. 721 P.2d 893,894 (Utah 1986) (case is moot where
requested judicial relief cannot affect rights of the litigants,
such as where order of license revocation has expired by its own
terms).
In his memorandum in opposition to this courtfs sua sponte
motion to dismiss, appellant spends a great deal of time

expounding generally the federal constitutional implications of
the appellee's actions, characterizing the issue as
"significant." However, appellant ignores the fundamental
reality of mootness. The focus of the mootness inquiry is
whether any requested judicial relief can affect the rights of
the litigants. With the expiration of the relatively short
expiration period, any "opinion issued by this court would have
no practical or significant legal effect upon the validity of the
revocation [] or upon appellantfs legal rights." Phillips, 802
P.2d at 110.
Nor would the requested result remedy a recurring wrong
affecting the public interest yet evading appellate review. The
departmental regulation upon which the alleged inconsistent
departmental action is based has been amended to conform to the
repeal of the statutory requirement for a sworn report, and the
issue raised by appellant cannot arise again. Thus, "the issue
raised is not of sufficient public interest that we should hear
its merits." Id.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

£cudith M. Billings, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

>rman H. Jacks^fi, Judge
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UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE

PUBLIC SAFETY
R708. DRIVER LICENSE

October 1, 1996

MlCEE
CHASLOTESVILLE, "VteGBOA

R70S-14-1
L = Restricted to vehicles not equipped Yrith air
brakes,
M = Motorcycle,
N ss Tank vehicle.
P = Passengers,
S = School bus. (includes P)
T = Double or triple trailers.
X = Hazardous material and tank combination.
Z = Taxis.
R708-10-4. Restrictions,
A =s None.
B = Corrective lenses.
C ss Mechanical aid.
D ss Prosthetic aid.
E = Automatic transmission.
F s= Outside mirror.
G ss Daylight only.
I «3 l i m i t - other.
J s= Other.
O s= 90 cc or les3 motorcycle.
U s= a 3 Trbeel cycle.
Vsr 40mph or less.'
W s= medicaL
References: 63-3-401 et aeq.
History: 10122, AMD, 09/05/89; 16314, 5YR, 11/15/94;
16315, NSC, 12/01/94.

indicating .08% or more can result in suspension or
revocation of the personTlicensa or privilege to
operate a motor vehicle.
#
If the person submits to that chemical test and the
results indicate a blood alcohol content of ,08% or
more, or if the oEcer makes a determination based
on reasonable grounds that the person is otherwise
in violation of Section 41-644, the officer shall serve *
on the person on behalf of the department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend
the person's privilege or. license to drive. Drivers
who refuse the chemical test will be dealt .with
according to policy and procedure Number IH-1 in
compliance with Utah Code Section 41-6-44.10.
(The department may use its discretion in granting hearings to drivers who make their request
beyond the ten days allowed by statute as it deems
appropriate. When granted, such bearings may as a
condition to being granted, be held beyond the 29
day limit set by statute in which case the suspension
would become effective on the 30th day after arrest
and would not be held in abeyance pending the
outcome of the bearing.)
If the officer serves that immediate notice on
behalf of the department, he shall take the Utah
driver license or permit of the driver and issue a
temporary license effective for 29 days
- only
- and
supply to the driver information regarding how to

Instruction Bulletin.
g five days after the cats of arrest the person's license,
R708-14-1. Aknini^u-veSuspe^on Hearing (Per S e ) . | along with a copy of the » £ & «
te^md
fte
R703-14-2. Limited licences.
•& nFHr^r'fi sworn report indicating the chemical test
R70S-14-3. Hearings on Refusal to Submit to Che=icaM r e s u ] t s (^ anyj and oilier information relevant to tne
list
^arrest and chemical test.
R70S-14-4. Point System Hearings — 21+ Years Old.
U
f a t t e n request from the arrested person,
- Provisional license
R70S-14-5. Point System ""
Hearing
'
~
"""" made within ten days of the date ofarrest, a Hearing
1S-20 Years OldL
shall be granted before the department: within 29
R70M4-5a. Coding Table.
R70&-14-5b. VioktioaCcdeforYTiiichAction^illb^Taken days after the date of arrest in the county in which
the arrest occurred unless the department and the
en In-State Failure to Comply.
person agree that the hearing shall be held in some
R70S-14-5c MVR Ceding Table.
R708-14-6. No-Fault Insurance Suspension.
° Policy - It is the department's policy for a hearing
R708-14-7. Fatal Accident Hearings.
officer or hearing examiner in the field to conduct
R708-14-8. In-state Failure to Appear CF.TA-'s).
R70S-14-9. Hearing Regarding Medical Issues and Special the hearing specified by law and in accordance with
administrative rale and submit a report ^ t a p e
Exaininationj.
.
#
R70S-14-10. Fraudulent or Unlawful Use of a Dnver Li- recording of the proceedings of the hearing to Dnver
S r r i c e s Administration. Action b y the Department
cense,
will follow in accordance with the:rep ort enbrnitted.
R70S-14-H. Fmmdal Responsibility Hearing.
P r o c e d u r e - The Central Office D.UX Secaon will,
R706-14-12, Hearing on Violation of Learner Permit.
u n t i m e l y receipt of a report o f D W " r e i t w d a
R70S-14-13. Leaving the Scene of an Acddent or Otber
S L l y request for a hearing from the arrested
Serious Violation,"
^
S
in Compliance with Section 41-2-130 schedR708-14-1. AcTministrative S u ^ e n s i o n H e a n n g ule a time and place for the hearing to be held. The
S v e r T S e arresting officer, the hearing officer, and
(Per g e ) .
^r^^-^™^*^
9 Authority
Authority U.C
U . ajraicSorraEErao-.
£ § S t e o 3 5 l & S 3 When a peace o n y e re ,s ^s e- 3^ b e notified.
Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a a n y ^
J £ g a f ^ rules of evidence and
ils
person may be violating or has violated Section
T ~ f n v f l 1 1 n o t strictly apply, the hearing officer,
41-6^,thepeaceoScermay,inconnectionwithhis V^£^^^*g&substantially
coinarrest oftheperson, request the person to submit to ^ ^ d u c t a g ^ h e a r m g . ^ rf ^
^ ^
fa

&
October 1,1996

UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE

SUPPLEMENT
BINDER 5
PARDONS (BOARD OF) TO WORKFORCE SERVICES

October 1, 1997
Insert this pamphlet at the front of Binder 5
MlCHIE
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

R708-6-3 (10/97)

PUBLIC SAFETY

R708-6-3. Provisions.
(1) Drivers eligible for the license Renewal-By-Mail
program may not have more than four traffic violations or
any reckless driving convictions on their driving record
during the five years prior to the date of expiration.
(a) During the same five year period, the driver's record
may not contain suspension(s), revocation(s), or medical
impairment which may represent a hazard to public safety.
(2) Drivers that have changed their name or do not have
the appropriate restrictions as per (Section 53-3-208) on
their present driver's license are not eligible to renew
through the mail.
(3) The Driver License Division will contact eligible
drivers by mail approximately 90 days prior to the expiration of their driver licenses.
(a) Drivers will be mailed an application form, medical
questionnaire, and general instructions.
(b) Drivers renewing 6 months prior to their 65th birthday, or who are currently over 65 years old, must furnish a
current Eye Examination Form or have an eye exam at a
Driver License Examining Office before renewing through
the mail.
(c) Drivers will mail in the completed application and
appropriate fee to the Driver License Division, after which
the division will mail out a renewal sticker to be placed on
the back of the driver's present license.
(4) A driver whose current license has been renewed by
mail, may not renew by mail in the following renewal cycle.
Drivers may renew by mail only once in a ten year period.
(5) Drivers whose driving record would allow them to
renew by mail but whose current license was previously
renewed through the mail, will be sent a notification that
must be taken to a Driver License Examination Office to
complete the renewal process.
(6) It is the responsibility of drivers to insure that their
present licenses are renewed before expiration. If a Renewal-By-Mail application is received after the expiration
of a license, it will be returned to the applicant and they
will be required to appear at a Driver License Examination
Office.
(7) Commercial drivers under the "Commercial Driver ^
License Act" do not qualify for the Renewal-by-Mail pro- I
gram as per Subsection 53-3-214(3)(b).
I
I
References: 53-3-214.
I
History: 9196, NEW, 02/17/88; 10121, AMD, 09/05/89; I
12743, AMD, 06/23/92; 12888, NSC, 06/25/92; 18596, 5YR,
01/23/97; 18573, NSC, 06/03/97.
R708-9. Repealed.
History: 18859, REP, 05/16/97.
R708-14. Driver Improvement and Control Instruction Bulletin.
R708-14-1. Administrative Suspension Hearing (PerSe).
R708-14-2. Limited Licenses.
R708-14-3. Hearings on Refusal to Submit to Chemical
Test.
R708-14-4. Point System Hearings - 21+ Years Old.
R708-14-5. Point System Hearings - Provisional License
16-20 Years Old.
R708-14-5a. Coding Table.
R708-14-6. No-Fault Insurance Suspension.
R708-14-7. Fatal Accident Hearings.
R708-14-8. Instate Failure to Appear (F.T.A.'s).
R708-14-9. Hearing Regarding Medical Issues and Special
Examinations.
R708-14-10. Fraudulent or Unlawful Use of a Driver License.
R708-14-11. Financial Responsibility Hearing.

8

R708-14-12. Hearing On Violation of Learner Permit.
R708-14-13. Leaving the scene of an accident or other
serious violation.

SKrIWfTy U.L.A. 41-^-iSdi. "When a peace officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating or has violated Section 41-6-44, the peace officer may, in
connection with his arrest of the person, request the person
to submit to a chemical test.
The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the
person's submission to a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more can result in suspension or revocation of
the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
If the person submits to that chemical test and the
results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08% or more, or
if the officer makes a determination based on reasonable
grounds that the person is otherwise in violation of Section
41-6-44, the officer shall serve on the person on behalf of
the department, immediate notice of the department's
intention to suspend the person's privilege or license to
drive. Drivers who refuse the chemical test will be dealt
with according to policy and procedure Number HI-1 in
compliance with Utah Code 41-6-44.10.
(The department may use its discretion in granting
hearings to drivers who make their request beyond the ten
days allowed by statute as it deems appropriate. When
granted, such hearings may as a condition to being
granted, be held beyond the 29 day limit set by statute in
which case the suspension would become effective on the
30th day after arrest and would not be held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the hearing.)
If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf of
the department, he shall take the Utah driver license or
permit of the driver and issue a temporary license effective
for 29 days only and supply to the driver information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before thee
department.
The officer shall send to the department within five days
&
after the date ot arrest the person's license, along with a
copy of the citation issued and theofficer'sswornreport
indicating the chemical test results™rn^anyT^ana^otne
information relevant to the arrest and chemical test.
Upon written request from the arrested person, made
within ten days of the date of arrest, a hearing shall be
granted before the department within 29 days after the
date of arrest in the county in which the arrest occurred
unless the department and the person agree that the
hearing shall be held in. some other county.
Policy - It is the department's policy for a hearing officer
or hearing examiner in the field to conduct the hearing
specified by law and in accordance with administrative
rule and submit a report and tape recording of the proceedings of the hearing to Driver Services Administration.
Action by the Department will follow in accordance with
the report submitted.
Procedure - The Central Office D.U.I. Section will, upon
timely receipt of a report of DUI arrest and a timely
request for a hearing from the arrested person in compliance with Section 41-2-130, schedule a time and place for
the hearing to be held. The driver, the arresting officer, the
hearing officer, and any witnesses will be notified.
Hearing - While formal rules of evidence and procedure
shall not strictly apply, the hearing officer, in conducting
the hearing, shall substantially comply with the fundamental rules of due process in legal proceedings. Sworn
testimony will be taken, and the driver shall have the
privilege of having witnesses present in his behalf. He may
offer testimony and may cross examine those who testify
against him.
%
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
Michael 0 . Leavitt h*
Governor ?:
Craig L. Dearden V
Commissioner £•
Ferris E. Groll %
Deputy Commissioner Z

Rod Ashby
Deputy Director
G. Barton Blackstock
Bureau Chief
Driver Services Bureau
K.J. "Skip" Nielson
Bureau Chief
Records Bureau

David A- Beach
Director
P.O. Box 30560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560
(SOD 965-4437 FAX (801) 965-4496

c

August 20,1997

Steven Lee Payton
Attorney at Law
431 South 300 East, Suite 40
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111-3298
RE: Lonnie R. ManFile No: 6979605
Dear Mr. Payton:
Your request for reconsideration in the case of Lonnie R. Mair was granted and
consideration has been made. Based upon preponderance of the evidence presented at the
administrative hearing, held on June 27, 1997, it is deteimined to sustain the findings,
conclusions, and decision of the presiding officer.
Since the presiding officer is sustained, your request for a stay of action, the issue of time
computation, and the unsworn report become non-substantive issues.
Sincerely,

Wallace G. Wintle
Manager
Driver Services Bureau

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
MAC**'.-

P.O. BOX 30560
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84130-0560
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JDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED
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*

Steven Lee Payton
Attorney at Law
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STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554)
Attorney for DEFENDANT
213 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2413
Telephone: (801)363-7070
Fax: (801)363-7071
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IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
*

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,

*

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
(Informal Adjudicative Proceedings]
JUCA 63-46b-15 "Judicial Review"J

*

Agency File No. 697-9605
vs.
LONNIER.MAIR,
Defendant / Petitioner.

*

c^J1-Mb-UQ>kk

*

COMES NOW, the defendant/petitioner in the above-entitled action and hereby files
this Petition for Judicial Review from Informal Adjudicative Proceeding of administrative
agency [Driver License Division] and alleges in support thereof the following:

v

" £H

STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554)
Attorney for DEFENDANT
213 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2413
Telephone: (801) 363-7070
Fax: (801)363-7071

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 2 4 1997
SALT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COISRX
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
STATE OF UTAH,

CI

n

^

c
e

Plaintiff/ Respondent,

^

LONNIE R. MAIR,
Defendant / Petitioner.
uo

^

<

MOTION TO VACATE
AGENCY ACTION FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION
[No Sworn Report]
&

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY
[Agency File No. 697-9605]

vs.

~* . *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Case No. 97-090-6650 AA
Judge, Anne M. Stirba
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U . S. S U P R E M E C O U R T R E P O R T S

4 L e d 2d

•[362 US 1991
•SAM THOMPSON, Petitioner,
v
CITY O F L O U I S V I L L E e t al.
362 U S 199, 4 L ed 2d 654, 80 S Ct 624
[No. 59]
A r g u e d J a n u a r y 11 and 12, 1960.

Decided M a r c h 2 1 , 1960.

SUMMARY
D e f e n d a n t w a s convicted in t h e Police C o u r t of Louisville, K e n t u c k y ,
of t w o offenses, loitering a n d disorderly conduct. A s t o loitering, t h e record
s h o w e d t h a t defendant, a long-time r e s i d e n t of t h e city, s p e n t a b o u t half
a n h o u r in a public c a f e ; t h a t he w a s seen on t h e floor dancing by himself,
t h e r e b e i n g n o t h i n g v u l g a r in h i s c o n d u c t ; t h a t w h e n asked b y a police
officer t o account for his p r e s e n c e t h e r e , h e said h e w a s w a i t i n g for a b u s ;
a n d t h a t h e w a s in t h e cafe w i t h t h e c o n s e n t of t h e m a n a g e r , who did
n o t object to a n y t h i n g d e f e n d a n t w a s doing. A s to t h e c h a r g e of diso r d e r l y conduct, t h e record showed only t h a t d e f e n d a n t , after h e w a s
a r r e s t e d a n d t a k e n out of t h e cafe, w a s v e r y a r g u m e n t a t i v e .
On c e r t i o r a r i , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t unanimously r e v e r s e d
t h e convictions. I n an opinion b y B L A C K , J., i t w a s held t h a t it is a violation of d u e process to convict a m a n w i t h o u t evidence of his guilt, a s w a s
done in t h e p r e s e n t case.
HEADNOTES
Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated
Appeal and Error § 389 — substantial sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or about
federal question.
any premises without first having ob1. Although the fines imposed by a tained the consent of the owner or
state court judgment are small, the controller of the premises, a convicSupreme Court of the United States tion is not supported by evidence, and
will g r a n t certiorari to review t h e does not comport with due process of
judgment, where the due process ques- law, where the evidence fails to prove
tions presented are substantial.
all three elements of the loitering
charge
Constitutional Law §840; Evidence
§ 995.5; Trespass § 6 — loitering Constitutional Law § 840 — due proc— elements of offense.
ess — evidence — conviction for
2. Under an ordinance making it unloitering.
lawful for any person, without visible
3. A conviction of violating by
means of support, or who cannot give loitering a city ordinance which makes
a satisfactory account of himself, to it unlawful for any person, without
ANNOTATION REFERENCES
1. Words as disorderly conduct, 48 ALR
2. Opprobrious words addressed to po83, 87.
liceman as breach of peace, 34 ALR 566.

T H O M P S O N v LOUISVILLE
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362 US 199, 4 L ed 2d 654, 80 S Ct 624
visible means of support, or who can- rested, w a s very argumentative, and
n o t give a satisfactory account of him- t h e r e was no testimony t h a t he raised
self, to loaf or trespass in any prem- his voice, used offensive language, r e ises without first having obtained the sisted t h e officer, or engaged in any
consent of t h e owner or controller conduct of any kind likely in any w a y
thereof, violates due process where all to adversely affect the good order a n d
t h e evidence showed was t h a t defend- tranquillity of the city.
ant, a long-time resident of t h e city,
[See annotation references 1, 2]
s p e n t about half an hour in a public
Breach
of Peace § 1 — disorderly conc a f e ; he was seen on the floor dancing
duct.
by himself, t h e r e being nothing vulgar
5. Merely " a r g u i n g " with a police
in his conduct; when asked by a police
officer to account for his presence officer cannot be "disorderly conduct."
{See annotation references 1, 2]
t h e r e he said he was waiting for a
b u s ; and he was in the cafe with the Arrest § 1 — waiver of objection.
consent of the manager, who did not
6. Under Kentucky law, if a m a n
object to anything defendant was do- wrongfully arrested fails to object t o
ing.
t h e a r r e s t i n g officer, he waives any
right to complain later that the a r r e s t
Constitutional Law § 840 — due proc- was unlawful.
ess — evidence — conviction for
disorderly conduct.
Constitutional Law §§ 836, 840 — d u e
process — evidence.
4. A conviction for disorderly conduct—under a city ordinance which,
7. J u s t as a conviction upon a
without definition, penalizes such con- charge not made would be sheer denial
duct—violates due process, where the of due process, so is it a violation of
only evidence of "disorderly conduct" due process to convict and punish a
w a s t h e single statement of a police of- man without evidence of his g u i l t
ficer t h a t defendant, after he was arAPPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
L o u i s L u s k y a r g u e d t h e cause for p e t i t i o n e r .
H e r m a n E . F r i c k a r g u e d t h e c a u s e for r e s p o n d e n t s .
B r i e f s of Counsel, p 1971, infra.
OPINION OF THE COURT
M r . J u s t i c e Black delivered t h e l o n g - t i m e r e s i d e n t of t h e Louisville
area, went into the Liberty E n d
opinion of t h e C o u r t .
Cafe a b o u t 6:20 on S a t u r d a y e v e P e t i t i o n e r w a s f o u n d g u i l t y in t h e
n i n g , J a n u a r y 24, 1959- I n a d d i t i o n
Police C o u r t of Louisville, K e n t u c k y ,
t o selling food t h e cafe w a s licensed
of t w o offenses—loitering a n d dis*[362 US 200]
orderly conduct.
The
ultimate
t o sell b e e r t o t h e public and *some
q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d to u s is w h e t h e r
12 t o 30 p a t r o n s w e r e p r e s e n t d u r the charges against petitioner were
ing the time petitioner was there.
so t o t a l l y devoid of e v i d e n t i a r y s u p W h e n p e t i t i o n e r h a d been in t h e
p o r t a s t o r e n d e r h i s conviction u n cafe a b o u t half a n h o u r , t w o L o u i s constitutional under the Due Process
ville police officers c a m e in o n a
C l a u s e of t h e F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d " r o u t i n e c h e c k . " U p o n seeing p e t i ment.
Decision of t h i s question
t i o n e r " o u t t h e r e on t h e floor d a n c t u r n s n o t on t h e sufficiency of t h e
i n g b y h i m s e l f / ' one of t h e officers,
evidence, b u t on w h e t h e r t h i s conaccording to his testimony, w e n t u p
viction r e s t s upon a n y evidence a t all.
to t h e m a n a g e r w h o w a s s i t t i n g o n
T h e f a c t s a s s h o w n by t h e r e c o r d a stool n e a r b y a n d asked h i m h o w
a r e s h o r t a n d s i m p l e . P e t i t i o n e r , a long p e t i t i o n e r h a d been i n t h e r e
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and if he had bought anything.
The officer testified that upon being
told by the manager that petitioner
had been there "a little over a halfhour and that he had not bought
anything," he accosted Thompson
and "asked him what was his reason
for being in there and he said he
was waiting on a bus." The officer
then informed petitioner that he was
under arrest and took him outside.
This was the arrest for loitering.
After going outside, the officer testified, petitioner "was very argumentative—he argued with us back
and forth and so then we placed a
disorderly conduct charge on him."
Admittedly the disorderly conduct
conviction rests solely on this one
sentence description of petitioner's
conduct after he left the cafe.
The foregoing evidence includes
all that the city offered against him,
except a record purportedly showing a total of 54 previous arrests of
petitioner. Before putting on his
defense, petitioner moved for a dismissal of the charges against him
on the ground that a judgment of
conviction on this record would deprive him of property and liberty1
without due process of law under
the Fourteenth Amendment in that
(1) there was no evidence to support findings of guilt and (2) the
two arrests and prosecutions were
reprisals against him because petitioner had employed counsel and de1. Upon conviction and sentence under
§§ 85-8, 85-12 and 85-13 of the ordinances
of the City of Louisville, petitioner would
be subject to imprisonment, fine or confinement in the workhouse upon default of
payment of a fine.
2. Petitioner added that the effect of
convictions here would be to deny him redress for the prior alleged arbitrary and
unlawful arrests. This was based on the
fact that, under Kentucky law, conviction
bars suits for malicious prosecution and
even for false imprisonment. Thus, petitioner says, he is subject to arbitrary and
continued arrests neither reviewable by
V>

4 L ed 2d

•[362 U S 201]

manded a judicial hearing to *defend
himself against prior and allegedly
baseless charges by the police.*
This motion was denied.
Petitioner then put in evidence on
his own behalf, none of which in any
way strengthened the city's case.
He testified that he bought, and one
of the cafe employees served him, a
dish of macaroni and a glass of beer
and that he remained in the cafe
waiting for a bus to go home.3 Further evidence showed without dispute that at the time of his arrest
petitioner gave the officers his home
address; that he had money with
him, and a bus schedule showing
that a bus to his home would stop
within half a block of the cafe at
about 7:30; that he owned two unimproved lots of land; that in addition to work he had done for others,
he had regularly worked one day or
more a week for the same family
for 30 years; that he paid no rent in
the home where he lived and that his
meager income was sufficient to
meet his needs. The cafe manager
testified that petitioner had frequently patronized the cafe, and that
he had never told petitioner that he
was unwelcome there. The manager
further testified that on this very
occasion he saw petitioner "stand•[362 US 2021

ing there in the middle *of the floor
and patting his foot," and that he
regular appellate procedures nor subject
to challenge in independent civil actions.
3. The officer's previous testimony that
petitioner had bought no food or drink is
seriously undermined, if not contradicted,
by the manager's testimony at trial.
There the manager stated that the officer
"asked me 1 had [sic] sold him any thing
to eat and I said no and he said any beer
and I said no . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) And the manager acknowledged
that petitioner might have bought something and been served by a waiter or
waitress without the manager noticing it.
Whether there was a purchase or not, however, is of no significance to the issue here.
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did not at any time during petitioner's stay there object to anything he was doing. There is no
evidence that anyone else in the cafe
objected to petitioner's shuffling his
feet in rhythm with the music of the
jukebox or that his conduct was
boisterous or offensive to anyone
present. At the close of his evidence, petitioner repeated his motion
for dismissal of the charges on the
ground that a conviction on the foregoing evidence would deprive him
of liberty and property without due
process under the
Fourteenth
Amendment. The court denied the
motion, convicted him of both offenses, and fined him $10 on each
charge. A motion for new trial, on
the same grounds, also was denied,
which exhausted petitioner's remedies in the police court.

contention that "there is no evidence

*0A. Ky Rev Stat § 26.080; and see §
26.010. Both the Jefferson Circuit Court
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that further review either by direct appeal
or by collateral proceeding w a s foreclosed
to petitioner. Thompson v Taustine, No.
40175, Jefferson (Kentucky) Circuit Court,
Common Pleas Branch, Fifth Division (per
Grauman, J.) (1959), unreported; Taustine v Thompson (1959, Ky) 322 SW2d 100.
w 5. Without a stay and bail pending application for review petitioner would have
14Lcd2d]—42

served out his fines in prison in 10 days
at the rate of $2 a day. Taustine v Thompson (Ky) supra.
6. Thompson v Taustine, No. 40175,
Jefferson (Kentucky) Circuit Court, Common Pleas Branch, Fifth Division (per
Grauman, J.) (1959), unreported.
7. Taustine v Thompson (1959, Ky) 322
SW2d 100.
8. Id. 322 SW2d at 101.
9. Id. 322 SW2d at 102.

•[362US203]

upon which *conviction and sentence
by the Police Court could be based*'
and that petitioner's "Federal Constitutional claims are substantial
and not frivolous."8 On appeal by
the city, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court
jacked the power to grant the stay
it did, but nevertheless went onTx>
take the extraordinary step "ST
granting its own stay, even though
petitioner had made no original application to that court for such a
stay. 7 Explaining its reason, the
Court of Appeals took occasion
to agree with the Circuit Court that
petitioner's "federal constitutional
claims are substantial and not
frivolous."8 The Court of Appeals
then went on to say that petitioner
• Since police court fines of less "appears to have a real question as
than $20 on a single charge are not to whether he has been denied due
Fourteenth
appealable or otherwise reviewable process under the
in any other Kentucky court,4 peti- Amendment of the Federal Constitioner asked the police court to stay tution, yet this substantive right
\he judgments so that he mi^ht have cannot be tested unless we grant
an opportunity to apply for certio~ him a stay of execution because his
ran to this Court (before his case fines are not appealable and will Tie
became moot)* to review the due, satisfied by being served in jail beprocess contentions he raised. The fore he can prepare and file his petiAppellee's subrtl
police court suspended judgment for tion for certiorari.
24 hours during which time peti- stantive right of due process is of no
tioner sought a longer stay from the avail to him unless this court grants
Kentucky Circuit Court.
That him the ancillary right whereby he
court, after examining the police may test same in the Supreme
court's judgments and transcript, Court."9
granted a stay concluding that
Our examination of the record
"there appears to be merit" in the presented in the petition for certio-
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rari convinced us that although the
fines here are small, the
Headnote i (jUe process questions
presented are substantial
and we therefore granted certiorari
to review the police court's judgments. 360 US 916, 3 L ed 2d 1532,
79 S Ct 1433. Compare Yick Wo v
Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L ed 220,
6 S Ct 1064 (San Francisco Police
•[2^62 US 204]

Judges *Court judgment imposing a
$10 fine, upheld by state appellate
court, held invalid as in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The city correctly assumes here
that if there is no support for these
convictions in the record they are
void as denials of due process. 10 The
pertinent portion of the city ordinance under which petitioner was
convicted of loitering reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person . . . , without visible means
of support, or who cannot give a
satisfactory account of himself, . . .
to sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or
about any premises, building, or
other structure in the City of Louisville, without first having obtained
the consent of the owner or controller of said premises, structure,
or building; . . ." § 85-12. Ordinances of the City of Louisville. 11
In addition to the fact that petitioner proved he had "visible means
of support," the prosecutor at trial
said "This is a loitering charge here.
There is no charge of no visible
means of support."
Moreover,
there is no suggestion that petitioner was sleeping, lying or trespassing
in or about this cafe. Accordingly
he could only have been convicted
for being unable to give a satisfac10. For illustration, the city's brief in
this Court states that the questions presented are "1. Whether the evidence waS
sufficient to support the convictions, and
therefore meets the requirements of the

4 L ed 2d

tory account of himself while loitering in the cafe, without the consent
of the manager. Under the words of
the ordinance itself, if
Headnote 2 the evidence fails to
prove all three elements
of this loitering charge, the conviction is not supported by evidence,
in which event it does not comport
with due process of law. The record
is entirely lacking in evidence to
support any of the charges.
•[362 US 205]
*Here, petitioner spent about half
an hour on a Saturday evening in
January in a public cafe
Headnote* 3 which sold food and beer
to the public. When
asked to account for his presence
there, he said he was waiting for a
bus. The city concedes that there
is no law making it an offense for
a person in such a cafe to "dance,"
"shuffle" or "pat" his feet in time to
music. The undisputed testimony of
the manager, who did not know
whether petitioner had bought
macaroni and beer or not but who
did see the patting, shuffling or
dancing, was that petitioner was
welcome there. The manager testified that he did not at any time
during petitioner's stay in the cafe
object to anything petitioner was
doing and that he never saw petitioner do anything that would cause
any objection. Surely this is implied consent, which the city admitted in oral argument satisfies the
ordinance. The arresting officer admitted that there was nothing in any
way "vulgar" about what he called
petitioner's
"ordinary
dance,"
whatever relevance, if any, vulgarity might have to a charge of loitering. There simply is no semblance
due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . ."
11. Section 85-13 provides penalties for
violation of §85-12.
[4 Led 2d]
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of evidence from which any person rested me for." We assume, for we
could reasonably infer t h a t petiare justified in assumtioner could not give a satisfactory Headnote 5 ing, that merely "arguaccount of himself or that he was Headnote 6 ing" with a policeman is
loitering or loafing there (in the
not, because it could not
ordinary sense of the words) with- be, "disorderly conduct" as a matout "the consent of the owner or ter of the substantive law of Kencontroller" of the cafe.
tucky. See Lanzetta v New Jersey,
Petitioner's conviction for dis- 306 US 451, 83 L ed 888, 59 S Ct
orderly conduct was under § 85-8 of 618. Moreover, Kentucky law itself
the city ordinance which, seems to provide that if a man
Headnote 4 without definition, pro- wrongfully arrested fails to object
vides that "[w]hoever to the arresting officer, he waives
shall be found guilty of disorderly any right to complain later that the
conduct in the City of Louisville arrest was unlawful.
Nickell v
shall be fined . . . ." etc. The Commonwealth (Ky) 285 SW2d
only evidence of "disorderly con- 495, 496.
duct" was the single statement of
Thus we find no evidence whatthe policeman that after petitioner ever in the record to support these
was arrested and taken out of the
convictions.
Just as
cafe he was very argumentative. Headnote 7 "Conviction
upon
a
There is no testimony that petitioner
charge not made would
raised his voice, used offensive lan- be sheer denial of due process," 12 so
guage, resisted the officers or en- is it a violation of due process to congaged in any conduct of any kind vict and punish a man without evilikely in any way to adversely affect dence of his guilt. 13
the good order and tranquillity of
*[362 US 206]
The judgments are reversed and
the *City of Louisville. The only in- the cause is remanded to the Police
formation the record contains on Court of the City of Louisville for
what the petitioner was "argumen- proceedings not inconsistent with
tative" about is his statement that this opinion.
he asked the officers "what they arReversed and remanded.
12. Dc Jon^e v Oregon, 299 U S 353, 3G2,
81 L ed 278, 282, 57 S Ct 255. See also
Cole v Arkansas, 333 US 196, 201, 92 L ed
C44, G47, 68 S Ct 514.
13. See Schware v Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U S 232, 1 L ed 2d, 796, 77 S Ct
752, 64 ALR2d 288; United States ex
rel. Vajtauer v Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U S 103, 106, 71 L ed 560, 563,

47 S Ct 302; Moore v Dempsey, 261 U S
86, 67 L ed 543. 43 S Ct 265; Yick Wo v
Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L ed 220, 6 S Ct
1064. Cf. Akins v Texas, 325 US 398, 402,
89 L ed 1692, 1695, 65 S Ct 1276; Tot v
United States, 319 US 463, 473, 87 L ed
1519, 1527, 63 S Ct 1241 (concurring opinion); Mooney v Holohan, 294 U S 103, 79
L ed 791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406.
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